The
poignant murder of the famous tree at Sycamore Gap of Northumberland, England (the
tree has been referred to as “sycamore gap” throughout this article for ease in
reading) had induced sentimental reaction and furore reportedly across the
world. Defined by its historicity and photogenic popularity, its felling by two
white men on a day of raging storm in 2023, to obfuscate their crime, was revenged
on May 8, 2025, when the Newcastle crown court found them guilty of the offence
of vandalism. Despite sentencing still pending, the case is a specimen distinguished
by its unique contribution to environmental litigation and particularly, acceptable
evidentiary standards in such cases. However, the case’s success must be set in
the right context which is defined by sycamore gap’s privilege in terms of
its situation, popularity and most importantly, singularity.
Without
any demeaning prejudice to Sycamore gap, contextualising its killing is
essential to reveal an intersectional privilege that was bestowed upon it.
Similar to caste- and colonial structures prevalent in the human society, duplication
of similar categorisation in the tree world is palpable. the tree was assumably
planted in the nineteenth century in a now protected heritage site. The tree was featured in a film titled, ‘Robin
Hood: Prince of Thieves’, and numerous famous photographs have featured it in
impeccable beauty and awe. Its singular situation in a vast meadow further buttresses
its identity. Indubitably, this heritage-linked identity made its murder more culturally
significant and legally questionable. The crime that the accused have been
convicted under is that of vandalism, of the tree and ensuing damage
to the adjacent historically-reputed Hadrian’s Wall, both owned by the National
Trust.
Having
put the case in its context, it is undeniable that the fame of Sycamore Gap was
relevant to attain the result of the accuseds' conviction under the Criminal Damage Act, 1971. The Act criminalises damage to
any property “belonging to anyone” intentionally or recklessly (§ 1); thus, the
offence is rooted in tort law, that is essentially, private law. Assumably,
this is also where the fact of ownership by National Trust has been of
consequence, which was entrusted with the protection of the heritage site and
that “owned” Sycamore Gap. However, this presents another peculiar and
potentially decapacitating factor to criminal liability for environmental
damage. Viewed from a higher point, this was essentially an anthropocentric
liability dispute, where sycamore gap was merely one privileged tree to have
been located in a heritage site with the National Trust as its steward. The
cultural and social reprisal to its killing put an impetus to setting in motion
the legal process that was consistently followed by all who had developed
acquaintance with sycamore gap. Conclusively, apart from the vertical
subordination of sycamore gap through the anthropocentric Criminal Damage Act,
that treated it as a property rather than an entity in itself (see this in the
context of Rights of Nature context), there also exists a horizontal subordination
where chances of avenging sycamore gap’s death were significantly higher.
This
second argument stems from the palpable differentiation between trees and
forests where the fame of certain trees/forests and their Global North
situatedness may facilitate their better protection from damage originating from
extractive activities. in this paradigm, the white men in the sycamore gap case
would be representative of fossil fuel mammoths and coal digging companies,
defined by their neocolonial streaks and capital-based privilege, that create
and sustain Shadow Lands (Klein, 2024). Here, the killing of forests and
trees (plural in number) is legalised by law, and the socio-cultural context is
conveniently suppressed. Here, namely the Global South, particularly India, the
bogey of economic development almost always takes precedence as evident in its
forest laws and majority of the judicial pronouncements that inexplicably seek
to balance development and conservation. Here, even if criminal liability for
felling trees exists, it is marred by coloniality and again, hierarchisation of
trees.
Take
the case of Hasdeo Aranya, Chhattisgarh, a densely
forested area spread over three districts, two of which are covered by the
Fifth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, and resided by at least four Adivasi
communities. After the identification of 23 coal blocks underneath the
forest and their allocation to rogue Adani, the procedure for committing
genocide of this forest was set in motion, that includes obtaining forest
clearance from the Central Government under the Forest Conservation Act, 1980.
Thus, here, the killing was orchestrated by public law, because the forest and
trees were not “owned” by anybody to claim private law remedy if any. This case
is also different because as required under various statutes operating in a
case of new developmental project, namely, EPA, FCA and FRA read with PESA, the element of public hearing
is crucial to gauge any objections to decimation of trees. While this is a
progressive legal principle in environmental law in India, to account for
rights of indigenous peoples who act as stewards of the forests, it was
blatantly dodged in Hasdeo, where the communities despite their opposition were
surprised to find their names in the consenting Gram Sabha resolution. Forgery committed
to supress cultural opposition to the killing of trees is another plane on
which sycamore gap is privileged, where its reputation was arguably essential
in getting the conviction against the two accused. Paradoxically, the
socio-cultural importance of Hasdeo is perhaps more consequential. Adivasi communities
of Hasdeo rely on forest resources for their livelihood, water and shelter.
Forest resources here do not involve killing the trees, but gathering of minor
forest produce such as flowers, fruits and leaves such as tendu and mahua.
The Hasdeo river is the bloodline of forest and the forest itself forms
an indispensable conduit between two statutorily recognised and protected
wildlife areas. Most importantly, Adivasi communities consider the
forest venerably, respecting and worshiping the trees for their existence.
Despite
robust cultural integrality and plurality, the situatedness of the trees of
Hasdeo Aranya render them cursed. Even if it is argued that private law has its
shortcomings in protecting trees everywhere due to its emphasis on “ownership” of
trees, public law in India at least does not account for them either, which
behoves a progression from its anthropocentricity. In all fairness, India has a
statute that expressly pegs criminal liability for forest decimation. And
ironically this is a colonial law, the Indian Forest Act, 1920, that the country has not
repealed since its introduction by the English colonisers. However, the statute
has its problems, which are not nominal. The statute creates a horizontal
hierarchisation among forests where reserved forests are the most reputed (§
30) and only against which criminal liability exists (§ 33). The other two
categories of forests are protected forests (§ 29) and village forests (§ 28).
The protection of protected forests depends on rules made by respective state governments
that may or may not provide for criminal liability as part of its regulatory
powers (§ 32). Apart from this hierarchisation that has colonial streaks at its
root, the Act is infamous for targeting Adivasi communities under the provision
for criminal liability, due to the fact that reservation of forests does not
magically vitiate the interdependent relation these communities may have with
the forest. Despite the introduction of FRA to combat jeopardization of Adivasi
communities and codification of their customary right to depend on forest
produce, the IFA continues to exist for those communities the forest rights of
which are not statutorily recognised. And problematically, the recognition of
these forest rights under FRA has been abysmal, leading to a legal stagnation
in effective protection of forests through empowerment of the socio-culturally peculiar position of forest-dwelling communities.
Rampant
criminalisation of forest-dwelling communities, considering their identity,
through the IFA also distinguishes them from the accused white men in Sycamore
Gap’s case. Sycamore Gap was killed by the accused for the “fun” of it, to gain
fame and aiming for impunity by blaming the murder on Storm Agnes. The
existence of mala fide intention to kill Sycamore Gap is more replicated in the
decimation of forests by Big Corporate for coal, other fossil fuels and other
mining activities defined by blatant extractivism and creation of Shadow
Lands (Chagnon, 2022; Klein, 2024). And yet, they get away scot-free;
nonsensically, owing to the prevalence of neocolonial market fundamentalism,
they are in fact aided by the state through its “environmental laws”,
especially the forest conservation act, 1980 in India. Yet, the criminalisation
is reserved for the Adivasi communities which are viewed with suspicion
by the bureaucratic state; companies are awarded the benefit of illogical “expost facto” clearance in fact, that rewards their violation of the already
“soft” law of FCA. This is where we stand in India, and potentially in other
developing nations.
Despite
Sycamore Gap’s unmatched luck that is criticisable when juxtaposed in countless
“sycamore gaps” that get killed everyday by state and corporate sanction, one appreciable
aspect stands with immense potential in environmental litigation. The jury and
judge were showed the footage of the crime, that exhibited absolute relentlessness
and sadistic pride of the accused while committing the crime. The inducement of
sorrow and vindictiveness that ensued is arguably existent in cases of
environmental decimation everywhere. When popular protest against
state-sanctioned environmental crimes is actively suppressed such as in India, courtrooms
may be the only place where that sorrow and vindictiveness can become
consequential. Principles of objectivity and rationality ingrained in law must
be rethought in environmental litigation, where the lacuna found in the existence
of flawed or unenforced statutes could be accounted for in adjudication, where
evidence of decimation and popular resistance, as it happens, brings into
perspective the scale of de facto killing of trees. This is key takeaway
that challenges the premise of objectivity of law that has so far aided
neocolonial adventures of Big Corporate.
References
- Naomi Klein, Doppelganger (Penguin, 2024)
- Christopher W. Chagnon et al., ‘From extractivism to global extractivism: the evolution of an organizing concept’, 49(4) Journal of Peasant Studies 760-792 (2022)
