War, Fossil Fuel Industry Complex and the Climate Crisis

Perpetual and simultaneous wars across the world have one other silenced victim: the environment. The connotation of environment here is as expansively imaginable as possible, from the atmospheric commons, to marine health, to terrestrial decimated landscapes, to the tiniest of non-human species. In other words, impacts of these wars have a direct and indirect consequence for the ecological polycrisis that we find ourselves in. However, what has irked the most with the Iran war is the centricity of fossil fuels, not only in fuelling the war itself (the connection between oil and war is evidenced by its historicity), but as a “victim”, with repercussions well beyond the realm of environmental damage, to impending economic devastation. I will focus only on the environmental consequence, which always tends to get overshadowed by economic concerns, well expressed through mainstream commentaries. This centricity has been made more poignant through pictures that communicate dystopia and apocalypse in no uncertain manner.

Terming fossil fuel as the “victim” here is not without its discomfort; after all, its production, combustion and consumption has been the primary cause of climate change. However, simplistically put, the war has involved putting gasfields and tankers on fire (in South Pars and Shahran), and decimating buildings (that has happened more severely in Gaza), among others, all of which have led to carbon emissions crossing the annual carbon emissions of the 84 lowest emitting countries taken cumulatively (this figure is for the first 14 days of the war, therefore, the estimates may have increased due to no ceasefire). The targeting of fossil fuels and urban landscapes has victimised the climate system and larger atmospheric commons; thus, I view fossil fuels as a symbolic victim. Targeting fossil fuel infrastructure in a war is not a clean transition; in fact, it is not an intended transition at all. The US, under the ruling dispensation, is a climate denier after all. On the contrary, such targeting is a deliberate attempt to accelerate the already aggravating status quo on the climate crisis, through direct emissions by bombing upstream facilities, as well as providing a reason to drill more fossil fuels when the world hits an imminent oil and gas deficit crisis. Unless this has a “shock and awe” (ironically, borrowing from Milton Friedman’s shock treatment as described by Naomi Klein) effect on the countries to invest more in renewable energy, which will be unlikely to achieve in a short timeframe as represented by the exigent times, this is yet another licence to the Seven Sisters led by Exxonmobil, Shell, BP and Chevron, all Western fossil fuel capitalists, to discover and intensify their operations, and maintain the Gas Industrial Complex (or the wider fossil fuel industry complex). An opportunity to strengthen the threatened corporatist dominance over an economic setup that is fuelled and sustained by fossil fuels.

When it comes to how international law would judge this assault on the atmospheric and ecological commons, there is no dearth of arguments to hold the US and Israel accountable for the consequences of targeting Iranian oil facilities in South Pars and Shahran. Firstly, it will be a war crime under Article 8 of the Rome Statute; the black clouds and GHG emissions from these instances have a clear “widespread, long-term and severe damage” to the natural environment. The spatial and temporal expansiveness of these assaults is undoubtedly clear (for the uninitiated, GHG emissions, particularly CO2, remain in the atmosphere for decades to centuries, with the longevity determined by the availability of carbon sinks on the planet). The intention to target with foreseeability of such consequences can be very well imputed (in the right circumstances, the defence of climate denialism should not work). However, the US, Israel and Iran are not parties to the Rome Statute.

Secondly, it is a violation of the 1976 Convention on the Prohibition of Military or any Hostile Use of Environmental Modification Techniques, to which the US is a party (with ratification) while Israel has not ratified it. As per the Convention, “environmental modification techniques” include techniques that change natural processes of the biosphere in its composition, structure or dynamics (Article 2). This definition would cover the destruction carried out in the gas fields, gas depots and urban settlements constituted of buildings, given the attributable short and long-term atmospheric changes, especially when linked to climate change. But, again, the only remedy under this Convention is complaining to the UNSC under Article 5 (with US obviously vetoing any such accusation).

Thirdly, the 2022 ‘Draft principles on protection of the environment in relation to armed conflicts’ impute State Responsibility to a State involved in an armed conflict if its actions lead to ‘widespread, long-term and severe damage’ to the environment. However, Principle 13(3) has an exception for a situation where any such attack has a military objective, which is clearly evident in the Iran war. In essence, this exception replicates the dominant proclivity that displays disposability of environmental concerns when confronted with traditionally venerated economic and, here, military imperatives.

Lastly, one could also read the ICJ advisory opinion on obligations of States in respect of Climate Change in an innovative manner, that could attribute State responsibility to the US and Israel for breaching the obligation of preventing damage to the climate system, now recognised under customary international law, by targeting fossil fuel upstream facilities that are leading to GHG emissions. In this case, there is a clear causation and attribution. This would require them to cease these “wrongful actions” and provide full reparation. However, do we imagine this roadmap playing out in this war? In all likelihood, no.

Because international law has failed to work as an effective regime to regulate international politics. This becomes glaringly evident in issues of transboundary importance, namely, climate change and transboundary environmental harms. Rhetoric and practices reflective of belligerence, impunity and recklessness in international relations have become increasingly prominent. The United Nations and ICJ have been portrayed as obsolete institutions through exhibition of, and complacency to, unilateralism, on which States, like the US and Israel (at least their ruling regimes) in the Iran war, pride themselves. And there seems to be little collective rebuke to such actions by other States (or if there is one, the involved States turn a blind eye). This is becoming clearer by the day; sensibilities and serious deliberations, crucial to tackle the climate and environmental crises, have disappeared (or are slowly disappearing).  

Bibliography:

-        -   Jay E. Austin and Carl E. Bruch, The Environmental Consequences of War: Legal, Economic and Scientific Perspectives (CUP, 2000)

-        -   Adam Hanieh, Crude Capitalism: Oil, Corporate Power, and the Making of the World Market (Verso, 2024)

-          - Naomi Klein, The Shock Doctrine (Penguin Books, 2007)

the unheard sycamore gap(s) of the world

 

The poignant murder of the famous tree at Sycamore Gap of Northumberland, England (the tree has been referred to as “sycamore gap” throughout this article for ease in reading) had induced sentimental reaction and furore reportedly across the world. Defined by its historicity and photogenic popularity, its felling by two white men on a day of raging storm in 2023, to obfuscate their crime, was revenged on May 8, 2025, when the Newcastle crown court found them guilty of the offence of vandalism. Despite sentencing still pending, the case is a specimen distinguished by its unique contribution to environmental litigation and particularly, acceptable evidentiary standards in such cases. However, the case’s success must be set in the right context which is defined by sycamore gap’s privilege in terms of its situation, popularity and most importantly, singularity.

Without any demeaning prejudice to Sycamore gap, contextualising its killing is essential to reveal an intersectional privilege that was bestowed upon it. Similar to caste- and colonial structures prevalent in the human society, duplication of similar categorisation in the tree world is palpable. the tree was assumably planted in the nineteenth century in a now protected heritage site. The tree was featured in a film titled, ‘Robin Hood: Prince of Thieves’, and numerous famous photographs have featured it in impeccable beauty and awe. Its singular situation in a vast meadow further buttresses its identity. Indubitably, this heritage-linked identity made its murder more culturally significant and legally questionable. The crime that the accused have been convicted under is that of vandalism, of the tree and ensuing damage to the adjacent historically-reputed Hadrian’s Wall, both owned by the National Trust.  

Having put the case in its context, it is undeniable that the fame of Sycamore Gap was relevant to attain the result of the accuseds' conviction under the Criminal Damage Act, 1971. The Act criminalises damage to any property “belonging to anyone” intentionally or recklessly (§ 1); thus, the offence is rooted in tort law, that is essentially, private law. Assumably, this is also where the fact of ownership by National Trust has been of consequence, which was entrusted with the protection of the heritage site and that “owned” Sycamore Gap. However, this presents another peculiar and potentially decapacitating factor to criminal liability for environmental damage. Viewed from a higher point, this was essentially an anthropocentric liability dispute, where sycamore gap was merely one privileged tree to have been located in a heritage site with the National Trust as its steward. The cultural and social reprisal to its killing put an impetus to setting in motion the legal process that was consistently followed by all who had developed acquaintance with sycamore gap. Conclusively, apart from the vertical subordination of sycamore gap through the anthropocentric Criminal Damage Act, that treated it as a property rather than an entity in itself (see this in the context of Rights of Nature context), there also exists a horizontal subordination where chances of avenging sycamore gap’s death were significantly higher.

This second argument stems from the palpable differentiation between trees and forests where the fame of certain trees/forests and their Global North situatedness may facilitate their better protection from damage originating from extractive activities. in this paradigm, the white men in the sycamore gap case would be representative of fossil fuel mammoths and coal digging companies, defined by their neocolonial streaks and capital-based privilege, that create and sustain Shadow Lands (Klein, 2024). Here, the killing of forests and trees (plural in number) is legalised by law, and the socio-cultural context is conveniently suppressed. Here, namely the Global South, particularly India, the bogey of economic development almost always takes precedence as evident in its forest laws and majority of the judicial pronouncements that inexplicably seek to balance development and conservation. Here, even if criminal liability for felling trees exists, it is marred by coloniality and again, hierarchisation of trees.

Take the case of Hasdeo Aranya, Chhattisgarh, a densely forested area spread over three districts, two of which are covered by the Fifth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, and resided by at least four Adivasi communities. After the identification of 23 coal blocks underneath the forest and their allocation to rogue Adani, the procedure for committing genocide of this forest was set in motion, that includes obtaining forest clearance from the Central Government under the Forest Conservation Act, 1980. Thus, here, the killing was orchestrated by public law, because the forest and trees were not “owned” by anybody to claim private law remedy if any. This case is also different because as required under various statutes operating in a case of new developmental project, namely, EPA, FCA and FRA read with PESA, the element of public hearing is crucial to gauge any objections to decimation of trees. While this is a progressive legal principle in environmental law in India, to account for rights of indigenous peoples who act as stewards of the forests, it was blatantly dodged in Hasdeo, where the communities despite their opposition were surprised to find their names in the consenting Gram Sabha resolution. Forgery committed to supress cultural opposition to the killing of trees is another plane on which sycamore gap is privileged, where its reputation was arguably essential in getting the conviction against the two accused. Paradoxically, the socio-cultural importance of Hasdeo is perhaps more consequential. Adivasi communities of Hasdeo rely on forest resources for their livelihood, water and shelter. Forest resources here do not involve killing the trees, but gathering of minor forest produce such as flowers, fruits and leaves such as tendu and mahua. The Hasdeo river is the bloodline of forest and the forest itself forms an indispensable conduit between two statutorily recognised and protected wildlife areas. Most importantly, Adivasi communities consider the forest venerably, respecting and worshiping the trees for their existence.

Despite robust cultural integrality and plurality, the situatedness of the trees of Hasdeo Aranya render them cursed. Even if it is argued that private law has its shortcomings in protecting trees everywhere due to its emphasis on “ownership” of trees, public law in India at least does not account for them either, which behoves a progression from its anthropocentricity. In all fairness, India has a statute that expressly pegs criminal liability for forest decimation. And ironically this is a colonial law, the Indian Forest Act, 1920, that the country has not repealed since its introduction by the English colonisers. However, the statute has its problems, which are not nominal. The statute creates a horizontal hierarchisation among forests where reserved forests are the most reputed (§ 30) and only against which criminal liability exists (§ 33). The other two categories of forests are protected forests (§ 29) and village forests (§ 28). The protection of protected forests depends on rules made by respective state governments that may or may not provide for criminal liability as part of its regulatory powers (§ 32). Apart from this hierarchisation that has colonial streaks at its root, the Act is infamous for targeting Adivasi communities under the provision for criminal liability, due to the fact that reservation of forests does not magically vitiate the interdependent relation these communities may have with the forest. Despite the introduction of FRA to combat jeopardization of Adivasi communities and codification of their customary right to depend on forest produce, the IFA continues to exist for those communities the forest rights of which are not statutorily recognised. And problematically, the recognition of these forest rights under FRA has been abysmal, leading to a legal stagnation in effective protection of forests through empowerment of the socio-culturally peculiar position of forest-dwelling communities.

Rampant criminalisation of forest-dwelling communities, considering their identity, through the IFA also distinguishes them from the accused white men in Sycamore Gap’s case. Sycamore Gap was killed by the accused for the “fun” of it, to gain fame and aiming for impunity by blaming the murder on Storm Agnes. The existence of mala fide intention to kill Sycamore Gap is more replicated in the decimation of forests by Big Corporate for coal, other fossil fuels and other mining activities defined by blatant extractivism and creation of Shadow Lands (Chagnon, 2022; Klein, 2024). And yet, they get away scot-free; nonsensically, owing to the prevalence of neocolonial market fundamentalism, they are in fact aided by the state through its “environmental laws”, especially the forest conservation act, 1980 in India. Yet, the criminalisation is reserved for the Adivasi communities which are viewed with suspicion by the bureaucratic state; companies are awarded the benefit of illogical “expost facto” clearance in fact, that rewards their violation of the already “soft” law of FCA. This is where we stand in India, and potentially in other developing nations.

Despite Sycamore Gap’s unmatched luck that is criticisable when juxtaposed in countless “sycamore gaps” that get killed everyday by state and corporate sanction, one appreciable aspect stands with immense potential in environmental litigation. The jury and judge were showed the footage of the crime, that exhibited absolute relentlessness and sadistic pride of the accused while committing the crime. The inducement of sorrow and vindictiveness that ensued is arguably existent in cases of environmental decimation everywhere. When popular protest against state-sanctioned environmental crimes is actively suppressed such as in India, courtrooms may be the only place where that sorrow and vindictiveness can become consequential. Principles of objectivity and rationality ingrained in law must be rethought in environmental litigation, where the lacuna found in the existence of flawed or unenforced statutes could be accounted for in adjudication, where evidence of decimation and popular resistance, as it happens, brings into perspective the scale of de facto killing of trees. This is key takeaway that challenges the premise of objectivity of law that has so far aided neocolonial adventures of Big Corporate.

 

References 

- Naomi Klein, Doppelganger (Penguin, 2024)

  - Christopher W. Chagnon et al., ‘From extractivism to global extractivism: the evolution of an organizing concept’, 49(4) Journal of Peasant Studies 760-792 (2022)